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Pounds: A Look at Philosophical Analysis

A Look At Philosophical Analysis
by Ralph 1. Pounds
Now after I have prepared this paper, I look again at the title and find it quite misleading. I started out to take a critical look at some aspects of philosophical analysis.
I end up finding that I have examined the role of philosophy (in general but with
a minimal consideration of its use in education - in that respect somewhat in continuation of the line of discourse established by Ballenger and Smith in previous
presidential addresses ) and I have stated a nd defended a point of view.
Since later on in this paper, I am going to stress the primacy and importance
of experience in any endeavor, including philosophy, a word about my own particular approach to philosophy may be somewhat enlightening in helping to understand
what I am to say. I came into an interest in and a study of philosophy via mathematics and the " exact" sciences. I was an undergraduate college major in mathematics and the physical sciences. While an undergraduate, I read in pa rt, on my
own, Whitehead and Russell 's Principia M athematica and , on the other hand , material then flowing out on Einsteinian science. While in a groping stage, I grasped onto
the behavioristic psychology, determinism, and the positivism of the period. However,
I discovered through my mathematical studies that absolute precision can be secured
only when we deal with a " language reality ." Russell 's ma thematical system was a
constructed and artificial language. " In mathematics you never know what you are
talking about nor whether what you are saying is true. " It is a narrow symbolism
theory - a speCial language. This language has been found helpful when adopted
as a tool for working on speCialized problems "abstracted out" of hum an experience.
The failure of Euclidean geometry, a beautiful logico-deductive system, to accord
with the realities of the Einsteinia n world and the failure of Newtonian science, another mathematical deductive system, to explain the phenomena of the physical world
led to the discredit and eventual failure both of absolute idealism and of objective
realism. (The first two failures would obViously be more Widely agreed to than the
latter. )
My work with Bode at The Ohio State U niversity quite well established the
fallacy of the extreme Watsonian behaviorism of the period and its mechanistic explanation of human behaVior, an inadequate description of human nature. As a
result, I reacted against logical systems and verbalisms and against attempts to
solve problems piecemeal (i.e., without consideration of the total pertinent Situational
field ). I accepted and operated within my conception of a pragmatic-instrumentalist
position Witll the emphaSiS on experience, tentativeness, and reflective thinking .
In the meantime, the logical approach was not dead . In the philosophical-
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analytical school, both in Europe (the Vienna and the Oxford groups) and in America, there has been an increasing interest in a linguistic analysis of philosophical
problems and a growth in the number of persons, both in general and educational
philosoph y, using this approach.
What Is Analytical Philosophy ?
When I attempted to define this term as related to this movement, I found the
greatest of difficulty. Like democracy, experience, and other broad and basic terms,
it appears to escape precise definition. Persons identified with this movement seem
in general to deal with the analysis of the language we use in communicating and
with a theory of the meaning which can be ascribed to language statements. The
central emphasis is on the linguistic analysis of the words or the statements (meaningful combination of words) used . I find at least three overlapping but distinctive
uses of the term in current scholarly circles: The field of semantics, the meaning of
words in general; the linguistic analysis of the structure of a language as used, such
as a structural analysis of American English (not in theory but as used); and the
examination of the role of language in the meaning of statements purporting to be
philosophical in nature (consideration of the role of language with respect to problems of meaning, truth, and value - age-old philosophical questions), philosophical
analysis proper. It is to the third meaning of the term I shall mainly address myself.
I am in general talking about the point of view of persons as found in the literature
ranging from Smith (B.O. ) and Ennis, Scheffler to Nowell-Smith, Ayer, Moore, Wittgenstein, and to Russell, Carnap, Strawson, and Copi.
These persons, of course, vary a great deal in their approach and emphasis.
They range from those desiring only clarification of the language for improving
the diSCUSSion of philosophic problems to those espousing logical positivism as a
definite philosophic position; from persons critically analyzing but using " ordinary"
language, to those who are largely abandoning the attempt to use such ordinary
language and who have moved largely to symbolic logiC and language (Copi, Carnap, Strawson).
Issues Involved
It would seem to be desirable to pull out, from among the great number of
issues and unresolved questions, some of those most important and basic for discussion:
1. What is philosophy? Ayer, and the more extreme logical positivists, seems
to have reduced or limited philosophy to the study of the language of statements
about knowledge. Does this clarification of language, for example, describing most
of the age-old questions of philosophy as meaningless, pave the way for eventual
complete philosophic agreement when there has been agreement on the meaning of
the language so that full communication has been established.
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2. Are there any necessary prior philosophical assumptions (ontological or
aXiological) before one can start any kind of investigation, scientific or philosophical?
If not, as many analytical philosophers hold, cannot philosophical differences be eliminated as language and the rules oflanguage are clarified?
3. Which has priority in investigation, human experience or language? Which
is the center of investigation and which is the tool? This seems to me to be the real
heart of the matter I am discussing.
4. What is an adequate theory of values or valUing? Running through all types
of analytical philosophy seems to be an antipathy to value considerations except as
they are held merely as expressions of human preference. There seems to be no thought
that a basis or procedure for validating hypothetical values might be established on
the same basis as methods and procedures for validating hypothetical statements
of knowledge.
Merits of Linguistic Analysis
Before entering into what is now eVidently to be a critical approach to philosophical analysis, I should like to list some of the positiv e contributions of this movement that are here not being questioned.
1. Clarification of the language used in philosophical discourse.
This is badly needed. The semantic problems involved in philosophic discourse
have been frequently a stumbling block to its success. Since philosophic investigation
must be carried on by language, it must be sharpened to convey clear meaning,
not used to obfuscate or to becloud the issue. However, language is a tool and not
the end. l Some of the hair-splitting of the inter-analytic discussion - Ayer vs. Moore,
2
Russell vs. Ryle - does not give confidence to the student of tlle method.
2. The continuation of the job of clearing out of the meaningless debris of
past philosophical discussion.
Each new development that has influenced intellectual thought has cleared out
much of the obscurities of previous thinking. Kant desired to substitute science for
scholasticism. Later the psychologists substituted behavior for mentalism and the
functioning organism for mind. The pragmatists and positivists of the contemporary
periods consider language propositions about an experienced world in place of the
" ideas" of the dualistic world of the idealist, and so on.
3. The clarification of the key role of language and logic in philosophic discourse.
The analysts have centered our attention, and rightly so, on the vehicle in
which the discourse is carried on, language and the need for clarification of its meaning continuously and on critically analyzing the rules of language and logic. This
is central and important but questions may be raised as to the role language plays
in relation to the objectives of philosophic discourse itself. Are the statements about
philosophical matters to be equated with philosophy?
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Certain Questionable Trends in Philosophic Analysis
Before proceeding to some examples to illustrate the relative role of analysis
in what appears to me to be essential in philosophic investigation, I shall list some
trends among some of the philosophic analysts that seem questionable.
1. There is a tendency among many of the analysts, in spite of a neutralist pose,
to legislate the nature of philosophy, rather than to limit themselves to their avowed
purpose, viz; to show how language used in philosophy may be clarified. For example, Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic, 3 eliminates what he calls " metaphysics"
in his first chapter by defining his terms in such a way as to render certain metaphysical propositions meaningless and then in Chapter VIII he proceeds to " solve"
all of the age-old philosophical disputes by using his set of definitions and criteria.
Even though I tend to agree largely with his interpretations, this does not convince
me that one can demolish another's view with one's own interpretations.
2. There is a tendency to assume and to assert that when the language has
been clarified (or at least after the legislation on the points involved has been established), the issues have been resolved. Philosophic differences, in this view, are purely
differences arising from lack of clarity, or inadequacies in the meaning, of the language involved.
3. There seems to be a tendency in analytic procedure that demonstrates, in
effect, an implicit belief by some analysts that reality resides in the words, the language, rather than in context the words are discussing or pointing to. This leads
into a modern version (but, of course, with different issues involved) of the old realistnomin alist controversy.
4. There is an increasing tendency toward some form of positivism - at least
among certain thinkers of the group - and not only those who use this term among
themselves - a new " quest for certainty, " long engaged in by certain objective idealists and by scientists of the old Newtonian variety. This certainty is to be achieved
by the positivists through limiting one 's statements only to those which can be verified by some undisputed means and eradicating all others as not logically necessary
or as not meaningful or significant. This shows itself in the Illinois group (Smith
and Ennis) as well as in the Oxford group.4
I do not have time to substantiate all of these statements by examples,5 but I
would like to devote the remainder of my discussion to a presentation of the role
and scope of philosophy ( or of the philosophic enterprise) as I see it. This will be
a pragmatic-instrumentalistic position.
The Nature and Central Role of Experience
Questions about the nature and procedures of philosophy arise ( as do other
questions) in the course of human experience as the individual deals with problem
situations. Experience is prior to all else. Experience is virtually undefinable since
it is the raw data as well as the context in which all meaning must be derived and
tested.
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Experience is the name applied to the product of the interaction of a sensing
organism with its environment, i.e. both with its self and its self-other (or its external
environment).6 All problems arise out of and meanings must be derived from the
probings and undergoings (trans-actions) of the organism with itself, its physical
environment and with other organisms with which it has communication. This communication, primarily through a developed language, extends experience of a direct
nature to en~ompass vicariously experiences of the whole group of communicating
organisms. The basic reality, in this point of view, is of necessity entirely within and
limited by the scope of human experience. Science, philosophy, values, language and
7
other questions arise out of and have significance only in reference to this experience.
The Role of Language
Man, the talking animal, developing in all stages - " primitive" to modern a complicated language, is able to use that language - itself a part of human behavior and experience - in order to probe and extend his investigations in the getting
of meaning as to his own nature and to his relation to the self-other. Language arose,
of course, in the process of establishing and improving communication between human organisms. 8 It enabled the organisms to share, among other things, at least
partially, experiences had by each when apart from each other. It is also used by the
individual as a tool in talking to himself (thinking) as an aid to problem-solving.
The organism without language is limited largely to trial and error beh avior. When
language facility has been gained, problem-solving in symboliC form may be used
to cut down the time necessary for scanning and eliminating many of the possibilities
and for finally chOOSing only one or two for actual testing or tryout. Such testing
by words (or thinking) is of course not conclusive and eliminations can and are
constantly being questioned.
Language is, of course, itself a part of human experience but may be differentiated from other experiences in that its basic purpose is to point to - to substitute
for - other experiences (frequently called real). Of course, other kinds of human
experiences, such as acting or mimicry, may also serve the same purpose as word
language but words potentially offer so many more possibilities.
Language then is a tool or instrument used by the human organism in problem-solVing, in its interaction with - in its probing of - its environment. It was in
the traditional idealistic philosophy that the word became the idea and was elevated
by Plato to be above and beyond human exp erience - transcending it.
When one leaves the realm of the directly experiential, to center attention on
some phase of it, when one abstracts, analyzes, theorizes, or generalizes, concentrating on words rather than what the words signify, all sorts of pitfalls can befall one,
as the history of man in general and of philosophy in particular can all too often
give powerful evidence. Wars, disputes, and all manners of cruelties have often involved the word separated from practically all Significance in human experience. 9
Language then is instrumental. It is a tool to clarification of situations. When
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one leaves experience and becomes involved in language manipulation the verbal
confusion may mount and some one must aLways say, "Let us see now, what does
this mean in experience (actual experience, probing into one's environment)? Do
these verbal differences actually make a difference?" 10
Since individuals approach a discussion with differences in experience, in values
and so on and even if language could be clarified (in the manner of the analytical
philosopher), it might serve only to indicate more clearly the differences rather than
to eliminate them. With language clarified, the differences would not be in language
or in meaning but would be experiential. Sometimes the vagueness in language had
merely obscured them. Clarity would show them up.
N ow if the individuals who differ are experimentalists, and the language is
clear, the differences will be in the content and scope of each individual's experiences.
Therefore deliberate attempts to widen the experiential content - to explore and test
out differences in common new experiences - might tend to resolve them, but pure
manipulation of the language itself wouldn't help. With other philosophical positions,
there might not be the same willingness to resolve the issue by mutual exploration
and enlarging the area of common experience. However, it would seem that the differences are the same in origin although not as readily resolved, for, often by philosophic commitment, the combat (pardon me, the discussion) must continue in words.
In the view which we are proposing here, language is still the tool for discovering areas that need further exploration. However, in other views with different epistemological assumptions as to how one arrives at knowledge, such differences cannot
be resolved by widening the common area of experience. From the standpoint of the
pragmatist, the other views have misunderstood or misconstrued the instrumentalist
nature of language; but, from their standpoint, the experimentalist is in error in his
assumptions 11 and no bridge can be built. To be sure, in certain limited areas of
activity they might work together and even may agree as far as certain limited operation and action are concerned, even though, the underlying explanation of what
is being done (and why) may differ and in many other areas not under consideration at that moment, they might differ even more basically.
A Theory of Valuation

E. Maccia in a paper 12 read before the recent Philosophy of Education Society
meeting called upon philosophers (including philosophers of education) to develop
what she termed a "synthetic" value theory as apart from the analytiC theory appropriate to ordinary knowledge propositions. It is practically impossible to find from
current philosophic literature any agreement as to the meaning of the words" analytic" or "synthetic," but it is clear that she feels that value theory is important and
basic and that it somehow must differ in nature from an analytiC (or empirical?)
basis for knowledge and further than, in instrumentalism, we do not find an adequate approach. She differs from many of the analysts in that she implies that one
is possible but not through what she calls "reductionism."
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In the same meeting, the paper by (Philip) Smith/ 3 " A Useful Limit for the
Is-Ought Dichotomy," seems to be a brilliant effort and a successful one to prove
that any such an apparent dichotomy (between propositions of existence and normative propositions) is a function of language rather than being founded upon human
behavior or experience.
As Dewey has pointed out in The Quest for Certainty and elsewhere, at one
tinle in the history of human thought value and fact were intertwined. Science made
its greatest progress because it separated questions of scientific fact from the unsatisfactory methods of resolving situations which had grown up. By defining scientific
terms or proposed generalizations, such as, What is the density of a given substance?
or What is the relation between pressure and volume of an enclosed gas with temperature constant? in such a way as to eliminate value considerations and further human
choices, it directed experiences assisted by refined tools of measurement and observation to develop highly accurate facts, data, and even far-reaching scientific generalizations quite free from possibilities of dispute because of careful limiting of the data
and the situations to those which could be standardized and were therefore not indeterminate.
The tensile strength of steel and concrete can be measured to almost any degree
of accuracy and the data placed in an engineering handbook. But, "ought we build
a bridge here and now? " involves to be sure, different kinds of decisions. The situation now is not standard but situational. Even if "politics" and human emotions
could somehow be eliminated there still is a different kind of decision here, involving
choices between conflicting values and considerations. The problem cannot be standardized and made objective in the sense that it is independent of time and situation.
Objective science then attempted to develop definitions, and standardized systematized procedures which were independent of particular situations. This was relatively easy in the so-called exact sciences - the physical sciences - as long as you
stayed with the standard universal situation; but in the social sciences, values and
situational considerations seem to play such an important role that it is next to inlpossible to eliminate them and to develop standard situations in which any observer
would arrive at the same answer. With Einsteinian physics, it is seen quite clearly
that the objective pose by science is illusory, and that even such stable meanings
as " mass" vary according to the position of the observer and the object under discussion.14 What I am trying to say is this: It is not so much that problems involving values are different from those involving exclusively facts but that we have badly
misconstrued the alleged objective nature of fact. Either may lead to an indeterminacy
when applied to a specific situation.
To try to help make my point clear by using situational examples rather than
highly " abstracted-out " propositions capable of " standardization," let us consider
the following:
1. Do you believe in (accept or choose) freedom as a value? (in the sense of
the right of the individual to choose) ?
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2 . Should there be a traffic light at this street corner?
3. Is this table solid?
Many persons might say "Yes" to the first although being more cautious some
might say, " Give me a f'r-instance. " The second example involving both questions
of value and fact would obviously depend on the location and situation. The third
is answerable only if you knew the purpose of the question, solid enough to hold
papers? a heavy object? or what? The scientist has tended to answer questions of
the third type by taking them out of a specific situation and by preparing in advance,
by standardized procedures, tables on the tensile strengths, stress factors, etc. of a
variety of materials. These data (or formuli) can then be used to answer such questions as to whether the table is solid enough for the object being considered or for
other purposes. The scientific facts involved seem to be objective and unequivocal
and yet the questions originally faced can only be resolved in a situational response.
The collected standardized data do not give us the answer directly if all we want to
know is whether we can safely set an object down on this table. Past experience of
a much less precise nature may give us a much better answer. Different situations
require data of a different sort, and the engineer would look foolish who would run
for his engineering handbook and slide rule for problems of this kind. Each situation requires its own precision of answer. 15 Furthermore, haVing determined that
this table is solid and that it will hold the object, some one may object that it is
not "solid" since the atomic physicist had discovered it is "really " empty space filled
with extremely small bits of matter (or energy). Even so-called objective (or standardized) scientific knowledge is only meaningful in terms of the situation or purpose
at hand .
The deCision involVing the traffic lights is full of value choices. Do we hold
that the installation of the traffiC light might be a better choice in terms of achieving
desired values consequential to it than would other alternatives (including inaction).
The values held by the individual and the consequences to those arising out of the
action would determine the appropriateness of any deciSion made.
It is in questions of the first type that broad generalizations, remote from the
Situations, are considered. Is there an ethical or value theory analogous to the scientifiC laws and data of the engineering handbook type that can be stored up and
then called forth to answer all questions of the value type? It is, of course, possible
and by analogy may seem plaUSible but actually such a handbook would be of
little value in resolving situations involVing value problems. 16 Although the resolution of value problems must be sought in human consequences, just as so-called facts
must be continually tested in experience, the complexities of situations that are constantly presenting themselves baffie any attempt to standardize and attempt answers
in advance. The question we are faCing is, Can there be a value theory - sources
and practices - just as tl1ere are tables of physical data and a set of standardized
procedures for establishing them ? Let us further see what is involved here.
In the first place questions of broad nature such as the one on freedom are
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vague and abstract. The process of verification might go something like this, "Yes
I do believe in freedom." In this situation it means thus and so operationally . I
then proceed to test out my hypothetical meaning of freedom as operationally derived in this situation. This particular deduced hypothetical application of this value
can be tested in exactly the same way as any other hypothesis can be tested. Do
the consequences of action in line with the postulated value in fact lead to the value
desired? Does it conflict with or jeopardize other values I wish to maintain? If the
latter, either it must be rejected or the other value discarded (in this Situation). If
the action must be rejected , the fault may lie in the hypothetical action rather than
in the abstract value, "freedom " and other possible deduced hypothetical actions
may be tried. 17
Many proposed value principles are untestable because they are too broad
and vague. Each has meaning and value only after it has been translated into a
hypothetical action which is testable. The main difference then between testing value
propositions and fact propositions lies in the step in which we go from the abstract
or universal to the specific action posited on it. This step in factual matters, although
also present, is so obvious or inconsequential that it is ignored.
It is my contention that valUing is a distinct, meaningful, philosophic process,
even in an instrumentalist approach. Value possibilities are testable just as are knowledge propositions. (In fact, I contend that it is only with difficulty that they can be
separated in actual human situations.) An adequate and tenable theory of values
to be worked out in advance of valUing is no more possible than would be a complete theory of sCientific knowledge to be completed before one could start assembling
knowledge. In this world of tentativeness and with fundamental changes occurring,
especially changes in the organism making choices of values, it cannot be expected
that an all-encompassing theory to resolve value problems for all times will be
achieved. 18 Let us be on with valuing! Let us not ignore value considerations nor
the value dimensions. Let us adjust tlle precision of our effort to the nature of the
situation at hand. Just as many scientific situations do not require micrometer calipers
so many value considerations are relatively simple choices but cruCially important
in terms of ilie consequences for human action. We cannot ignore values (or the
necessity for value chOices). Let us not pretend we can but let us bring them to the
open for consideration. 19
Philosophical analysts can be helpful in clarification of logic and in seeing
what the role of language is wiiliin ilie framework of ilie experiential process. Philosophical analysts cannot legislate ilie nature of philosophy but can set forili for
consideration claims based on a presumed lack of meaning of certain kinds of propoSitions, such as value statements. The differences in philosophy cannot be eliminated
purely by language manipulation. Language is a tool - not the complete subject
matter of philosophic endeavor.
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FOOTNOTES
It seems impossible to conceive of a human behavior labelled " philosophic" without language. The
abstracting out of experience of certain elements for consideration, the naming of these, and the manipulating of these word-symbols make up the content of philosophy. Yet like all other human behav ior,
such symbolic manipulation must eventually alTect human behavior in some way outside of the mere
verbal manipulation of those symbols.
2 This could lead to a new " scholasticism "- much belaboring of the inconsequential.
3 ;.: ew York: Dover ( 1946 ).
4 I find myself much more in agreement with tl,e lllinois group and with Schemer than with the others I
have examined. For example, in the recent Language and Concepts in Education by R. I-I. Ennis and
B. O. Smitl" Chicago: Rand .\lcNally ( 1961), I take important issue only with Smitll 's forcible separation of teaching from learning and Witll Ennis ' attempt to argue away the necessity for prior assumptions.

5 This is not easy to do since a quotation out of context would not reveal it. It would seem to involve
more of a total appraisal of tl,e effect of the total enterprise as carried on by each person analyzed .

6 I still find that Dewey's Experience and Nature and Experience alld Education provide the most satisfactory extended discussions of tl,e nature and role of experience.
7 This does not rule out in advance any kind of question or decide an exclusive nature of experience.
The field of parapsychology, for example, can be included if it can be shown to have a testable existence within human experience.

8 It can be seen that to me communication is more inclusive tl,an language, including ( for example ) observation of activity directly. (pantomime, acting, mimicry, sign symboLism, etc.)
9 \Yendall Johnson 's People in Quandaries ( Harper, 1946 ) is full of examples, historical and individual ,
where language has become tl,e main source of maladjustment and serious conflict. Johnson is a clinical
psychologist who is both a student of semantics and of personal adjustment. lie is tied in with Korzybski's
" general semantics" pOSition.
10 Many discussions in philosophy and politics qualify as examples here. The recent article by Champlin
on i\1 accia's paper [Studies ill Philosophy (l/id Educatioll, 2, Number 3 (Summer, 1963), 258-28'[7 ,
tl,e Smitl" Cowin, Aschner controversy on tl,e teaching-learning concept [Ibid., I, Number 3 ( August,
1961 ), 1-113; II, Number 2 (Spring, 1962), 172-202; and 1I, Number 3 (Summer, 1962), 287-24[7,
and many of tl,e attempts by tl,e analysts themselves to define facts, propOSition, etc. are in part lost
in verbalism and one needs to ask, Does this make a difference? or In what situations does tl,e particular point made apply '
1l It can be readily seen that in my view such assumptions are not unavoidable. On tl,is respect I differ
basically with Ennis ( pp. 161ff. ) in Lallguage and Conce/Jis ill Education.

12 " The Role of Synthetic Philosophy in Philosophy of Education. " Proceedings, Philosophy of Education
SOCiety, 1962 , pp. 21-26.
13 Ibid., pp. 27-32.
Smitll 's paper may very well be tl,e key to unlock some of tl,e important difficulties here.)-Iowever, I do
not agree witll some of tl,e language used. The " is-ness and the oughlness" (for tl,e descriptive and the
normative ) have idealistic overtones.
14 Both Newtonian and Einsteinian sdence abound with examples in which precision gives way to practicality
or SimpliCity. In classical physics, frequently in the development of formulas, in addition to such phrases
as "neglecting friction," often we find " since this term is nearly equal to 1 (or to 0), we can neglect it
and then our formula will read ... " In Einsteinian physics tl,e differential equations for defining the
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nature of space surrounding matter are so complex as to be virtually insoluble until simplifications are
made which do not significantly change the numerical answers. Cf. D 'Abro, The EvoLution of Scientific
Thought: from Newton to Einstein. New York: Dover, 1950.
15 Newsome's paper, "Ordinary Language Philosophy and Education." (Proceedings, Philosophy of Education SOCiety, 1962, pp. 90-99) seems to make a good case for ordinary language as "used among
rather ordinary folk" as being more appropriate to discourse about education: Linguistic analysis rather
than philosophic analysis would tllen seem more desirable.
16 " The Basic Premises of American Liberty" developed by the Citizenship Education Project of Columbia
University (in" Improving Citizenship Education," Append. A, Columbia University, 1955) represents
one worthwhile atlen1pt among others to assess and assemble tlle major values of a culture. While these
are quite helpful and deserve major study and attention, tlley neither answer the value problems involved
in a specific situation nor do tlley provide a clue to or a basis for changes in values.
17 [n general I think the position that I have set forth here on the relation of the factual to the valuative
is in line with that proposed by Morton White in his Toward Reunion in Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 1956), Chapters XVI and XVII, although it is not identical and there are inlportant variations.
18 My presentation of a rationale of valuing is held to be in accord with Dewey's view in his " Theory
of Valuation," /ntemaiional Encyclopedia of Unified SCience, Volume II, Number 4 (still available as
a monograph from University of Chicago Press). Dewey'S discussion of how we go about tlle process of
valUing is analagous to recent accounts of the philosophy of science - how we valid ate proposed statements of fact. Smith's (Philip) paper and my attempt to spell out the value validation process are merely
clarifications of certain aspects of this view.
19 If tllis seems exhortatory or ejaculative, let me point out that Maccia's call for a synthetiC value theory
was also so couched, e.g. "Let us be done with reductionism ... Let us be done. . Let uS be done
with," etc. (p. 261, Proceeding!>; PhiLosophy of Education SOCiety, 1962 ).
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